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Whaling in Circles: The Makahs,
the International Whaling Commission,
and Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling
Monder Khoury
In Anderson v. Evans, the Ninth Circuit held that the International Whaling Commission
(“IWC”) Schedule’s approval of a quota to hunt whales for the Native American Makah
Tribe (“Makahs”) violated the Marine Mammal Protection Act. The implications of this
holding were troubling: despite the U.S. government and the IWC approving, on domestic
and international levels, the Makahs’ whaling proposal in the 1990s, the Makahs were still
unable to hunt whales legally. The Makahs’ right to whale stemmed from the 1855 Neah
Bay Treaty, an agreement between the Makahs and the U.S. government in which the
government promised the Makahs the right to whale. However, the enactment of a
domestic law called the Whaling Convention Act in 1949 superseded the treaty, rendering
it void.
Yet, enforcement of these domestic and international approvals presents problems. First,
allowing the Makahs to resume whaling risks setting a dangerous precedent that will
trigger a “domino effect,” causing other countries to resume whaling as well. Further, the
international community might perceive the IWC’s approval of the Makahs’ whaling as
favoritism to the United States. Such a perception might lead to further fragmentation of
the global community regarding whaling. Accordingly, this Note suggests that the
moratorium on whaling be lifted for specific whale stocks because oftentimes, a complete
ban results in unnecessary and avoidable violations of the law. Further, this Note suggests
that other countries be allowed to whale under science-based IWC regulations to achieve
international consensus and yield better compliance.

 J.D. Candidate, 2016, University of California Hastings College of the Law. I would like to
thank Professor David Takacs for inspiring me to explore this topic and for providing feedback and
guidance in writing this Note. Many thanks to the Hastings Law Journal Notes team and other
colleagues for their thoughtful feedback. This Note is dedicated to my parents, Abouna George and
Amal Khoury, for their selfless support and continued sacrifice.
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Introduction
Whales are beautiful, majestic, and intelligent animals capable of
1
feeling pain, yet are playful and humorous. Whales have roamed Earth’s
2
seas for more than ten million years, and humans have been hunting
3
whales for only a few thousand of those years. The Native American
4
Makah Tribe (the “Makahs”), located in northwestern Washington, had
1. Rupa Gupta, Indigenous Peoples and the International Environmental Community:
Accommodating Claims Through a Cooperative Legal Process, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1741, 1759 (1999).
2. Cliff M. Stein, Whales Swim for Their Lives as Captain Ahab Returns in a Norwegian
Uniform: An Analysis of Norway’s Decision to Resume Commercial Whaling, 8 Temp. Int’l & Comp.
L.J. 155, 157 (1994).
3. Peter J. Stoett, The International Politics of Whaling 152 (1997).
4. Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F.3d 1135, 1137 (9th Cir. 2000).
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5

hunted whales for thousands of years when they signed the Neah Bay
Treaty (“Treaty”) with the U.S. government in 1855 for the right to
6
continue whaling. However, in the 1920s, the Makahs voluntarily ceased
whaling due to concerns with whale extinction as a result of commercial
7
whaling. In 1946, the international whaling community established the
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (“ICRW”) in an
8
attempt to regulate whaling globally. In the 1960s and 70s, the United
States enacted the Whaling Convention Act (“WCA”) and the Marine
Mammal Protection Act (“MMPA”), which prohibited whaling
9
domestically. The IWC, an organ of the ICRW, implemented a complete
ban on commercial whaling in 1986, but made an exception for aboriginal
10
subsistence whaling. As a result, whaling became prohibited under both
U.S. and international law.
In the 1990s, the Makahs asked the U.S. government to allow them
11
to resume subsistence whaling. However, under international and U.S.
law, it remains unclear whether the U.S. government may allow its
Native American tribes to hunt whales. That is, allowing the U.S.
government to approve subsistence whaling opens the questions of who
determines whether a tribe qualifies for an aboriginal subsistence
exception under the IWC and who determines the makeup of the quota.
When the Makahs wanted to resume whaling, the WCA had already
superseded the Neah Bay Treaty, thus rendering the Makahs’ Treaty
12
right to hunt whales void. Nonetheless, the U.S. government presented
the Makahs’ proposal to the IWC and successfully obtained a quota on
13
their behalf. However, the Ninth Circuit subsequently determined that
the U.S. government’s representation of the Makahs violated domestic
14
laws. Therefore, although the U.S. government and the IWC permitted
15
the Makahs to hunt whales, they were still unable to do so legally.

5. Id.
6. Treaty of Neah Bay, U.S.-Makah, Jan. 31, 1855, 102 Stat. 939.
7. Metcalf, 214 F.3d at 1137.
8. David Hunter et al., International Environmental Law and Policy 1050 (4th ed. 2011).
By 1946, the Makahs had voluntarily ceased whaling due to concerns with rapidly decreasing whale
stocks. Metcalf, 214 F.3d at 1137.
9. 16 U.S.C. § 1361 (2013).
10. See Anderson v. Evans, 314 F.3d 1006, 1012 n.7 (2002) (prohibiting the taking or killing of
gray whales except where whale meat and products will be used by aborigine subsistence); Brian T.
Hodges, The Cracking Facade of the International Whaling Commission as an Institution of
International Law: Norwegian Small-Type Whaling and the Aboriginal Subsistence Exemption, 15 J.
Envtl. L. & Litig. 295, 303–04 (2000).
11. Metcalf, 214 F.3d at 1138.
12. See infra Part IV.B.
13. Metcalf, 214 F.3d at 1140; see also Anderson, 314 F.3d at 1013.
14. See Metcalf, 214 F.3d at 1135; Anderson, 314 F.3d at 1006.
15. See Metcalf, 214 F.3d at 1135; Anderson, 314 F.3d at 1006.
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Parts I and II of this Note provide a brief history of whaling and the
Makahs, followed by international and U.S. laws regarding whaling in
Parts III and IV. Part IV also discusses the reasons the Ninth Circuit
ruled against the Makahs’ whaling plans in two cases. Part V focuses on
the current fragmentation within the international community and the
risks of allowing the Makahs to hunt whales. Part VI explains the current
state of whaling and the revival of certain whale stocks. Finally, Part VII
of this Note presents a viable solution: lifting the moratorium and
allowing whaling to resume for specific whale stocks under science-based
IWC regulations. This will also clarify whether the U.S. government may
allow certain Native American tribes to hunt whales and how the quota
is to be determined.
I. History of Whaling
16

Humans have been whaling for thousands of years, using nearly
17
every part of the animal. Traditionally, humans ate the whales’ meat,
organs, and blubber, and used baleen, oil, and bones for various
18
purposes. Whales were considered “a free resource, a gift from nature
19
available to anyone who would hunt and kill them.” Before the Basques
of Biscay, modern-day Spain, initiated industrialized and organized
20
whaling in the eleventh century, humans lacked the necessary
technology to catch whales in large numbers, and overexploitation was
21
not an issue. Whaling gradually increased, and by the fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries, whaling spread to the North Atlantic where the
22
Dutch and the British had begun whaling. Less than a century later,
23
several whale species were on the verge of extinction. Throughout the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, whaling brought “untold wealth” to
24
nations and “their national treasuries.” And in the nineteenth century,
whale carcasses were worth over $2000, making whaling a highly

16. See Stoett, supra note 3.
17. Sarah Suhre, Misguided Morality: The Repercussions of the International Whaling
Commission’s Shift from a Policy of Regulation to One of Preservation, 12 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev.
305, 307 (1999); Meghan E. Marrero & Stuart Thornton, Big Fish: A Brief History of Whaling, Nat’l
Geographic (Nov. 1, 2011), http://education.nationalgeographic.com/education/news/big-fish-historywhaling/.
18. See Suhre, supra note 17; see Marrero & Thornton, supra note 17.
19. Anthony D’Amato & Sudhir K. Chopra, Whales: Their Emerging Right to Life, 85 Am. J.
Int’l L. 21, 28 (1991).
20. Gerry J. Nagtzaam, The International Whaling Commission and the Elusive Great White
Whale of Preservationism, 33 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 375, 389 (2009); see also Suhre,
supra note 17.
21. See Nagtzaam, supra note 20.
22. Id.; see also Suhre, supra note 17.
23. See Suhre, supra note 17.
24. See Nagtzaam, supra note 20.

L - Khoury_12 (Hamilton_12.7) (Do Not Delete)

December 2015]

WHALING IN CIRCLES

12/15/2015 6:06 PM

297

25

profitable industry. Although whaling began having a noticeable
negative impact on whale stocks, the short-term economic incentive
deterred nations from ceasing whaling, “leading to what we would now
26
consider to be a classic instance of the ‘tragedy of the commons.’”
Americans began whaling in the eighteenth century, and by the
nineteenth century, they had developed “one of the world’s leading
27
whaling fleets,” which depleted whale stocks on America’s coasts. In
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, technological
28
developments made whaling easier and more efficient than ever.
Whaling technology at that stage included harpoon guns and floating
factory ships powered by steam engines, which enabled whalers to catch
faster moving and larger whales, and to load them onto the floating
29
factory ships. As a result, “more whales were killed in the first forty
30
years of the twentieth century than in the previous four hundred years.”
During that time, countries became concerned with the depleting whale
stocks worldwide and began regulating commercial whaling activities in
31
order to prevent whales from going extinct.
II. The Makahs and Whaling
The Makah Tribe is a Native American tribe that still resides on
32
Washington’s Olympic Peninsula. The Makahs have a 1500-year
33
tradition of whale hunting, but old deposits found on Makah territory,
including barbs from harpoons and gray whale bones, date back 2000
34
years. Unlike the global trend, however, the Makahs did not engage in
commercial whaling. Rather, they hunted for subsistence and cultural
35
purposes. Whales once accounted for up to eighty percent of the
Makahs subsistence, “and the rigorous training and preparation required

25. Id. at 390. In 1875, $2000 was equivalent to over $40,000 in 2014. See Relative Values – US $,
MeasuringWorth.com (last visited Dec. 18, 2015) (using Initial Year of 1875, Initial Amount $2000,
and Desired Year 2014).
26. Nagtzaam, supra note 20, at 390–91. “Tragedy of the commons” occurs when independent
actors progressively exploit and ultimately destroy a common resource. See The Oxford Handbook
of International Environmental Law 557 (Daniel Bodansky et al. eds., 2007).
27. See Stein, supra note 2, at 159.
28. Id. at 159–61.
29. Id.; see also Nagtzaam, supra note 20, at 391.
30. David S. Lessoff, Jonah Swallows the Whale: An Examination of American and International
Failures to Adequately Protect Whales from Impending Extinction, 11 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 413, 417
(1996).
31. See Nagtzaam, supra note 20, at 391–92.
32. Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F.3d 1135, 1137 (9th Cir. 2000).
33. Id.
34. Lawrence Watters & Connie Dugger, The Hunt for Gray Whales: The Dilemma of Native
American Treaty Rights and the International Moratorium on Whaling, 22 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 319, 323
(1997).
35. Id.
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36

for a hunt involved the entire community.” For the Makahs, “[w]haling
provided not merely food, clothing and shelterit formed an integral
37
part of the world view, heritage, and identity.”
The Makahs are known to target the Eastern North Pacific gray
38
whale, whose annual migration passes near the Olympic Peninsula. In
1855, the Makahs signed the Neah Bay Treaty with the U.S. government,
relinquishing most of their land in exchange for the continued right to
39
whale. In the 1920s, the Makahs voluntarily ceased whaling because
“the widespread commercial whaling had devastated the population of
40
gray whales almost to extinction.” At that time, estimates of the gray
41
whale population were less than 5000. Thus, “notwithstanding the
important cultural role this practice played in their community,” the
42
Makahs did not hunt whales for the next seventy years. The Makahs
thought of this as a temporary solution and always planned to resume
43
whaling once the whale stocks had recovered.
In 1970, nearly fifty years after the Makahs ceased whaling, the gray
whale was on the endangered species list created by the domestic
44
Endangered Species Act. By 1993, the Eastern North Pacific stock of
45
gray whales recovered and was no longer in danger of extinction. The
following year, the gray whale was no longer on the endangered species
46
list. Subsequently, the Makahs decided to revive their important
47
cultural practice of whaling. The Makah leaders claimed that resuming
whaling would “not only contribute to the [Makahs’] subsistence and
economic needs, but it [would] also help to revive a sense of community,
48
self-worth and spirituality.” However, by the 1990s, the ICRW, and its
domestic counterpart, the WCA, prohibited whaling all together. As a
result, the Makahs had to go through domestic and international hurdles
to resume whaling.

36. Id. at 323–25.
37. Id. at 325.
38. Metcalf, 214 F.3d at 1137.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See Watters & Dugger, supra note 34. In 2007, estimates of the same stock were between 17,000 and
22,000. Whale Population Estimates, Int’l Whaling Commission, http://iwc.int/estimate#table (last
visited Dec. 18, 2015).
42. Metcalf, 214 F.3d at 1137.
43. See Watters & Dugger, supra note 34.
44. Metcalf, 214 F.3d at 1138. This Act was previously known as the Endangered Species
Conservation Act of 1969. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Watters & Dugger, supra note 34, at 324.
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III. The International Convention for the
Regulations of Whaling
One of the major international hurdles that the Makahs faced was
the ICRW, which ultimately led to the implementation of the
moratorium. The international community established the ICRW in 1946
49
due to concerns with over-hunting whales and pressure from the United
50
States and nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”). Since its
establishment, the ICRW has become the dominant international
51
agreement regulating whaling. Because the ICRW’s regulations extend
to all waters in which whaling occurs, it protects whales throughout their
52
migration. The ICRW’s original goal was to provide a system for
53
managing whale fishery stocks at a sustainable level. However, the
preamble’s contradictory goals of biodiversity conservation and fishery
54
management have sparked a debate over the ICRW’s true purpose.
Nonetheless, since its creation, the ICRW’s mandate has undoubtedly
shifted from regulations of whaling fishery to a moratorium, or a
55
complete ban, on commercial whaling. The ICRW implemented the
moratorium through the IWC.
A. The IWC and Its Rival
Article III of the ICRW created the IWC, which ultimately
56
implemented the moratorium on commercial whaling. The IWC is
57
considered the “ICRW’s most important innovation,” and is composed
58
of one member from each “Contracting Government.” Although the
IWC has no enforcement authority, Contracting Governments are
59
required to report the number of all hunted whales to the IWC. The
IWC uses the data from these reports, studies, and investigations to
60
determine the level of protection necessary for certain whale stocks.
61
Such protections become part of the ICRW Schedule through

49. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, T.I.A.S.
No. 1849.
50. See Watters & Dugger, supra note 34, at 321–32.
51. See Hunter et al., supra note 8, at 1049.
52. Id. at 1050.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1050–54.
57. Id. at 1050.
58. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, supra note 49, at art. III.
Contracting Government is “any Government which has deposited an instrument of ratification or has
given notice of adherence to this Convention.” Id. at art. II.
59. See Hunter et al., supra note 8, at 1051.
60. Id. at 1050–51.
61. The ICRW Schedule is “[a]n integral part of the Convention” and is legally binding on a
Contracting Government. History and Purpose, Int’l Whaling Commission, https://iwc.int/history-
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amendments, which require a three-fourths majority vote of the
62
Contracting Governments in order to pass.
The moratorium includes two exceptions. The first is an exception
63
for scientific research specifically outlined in Article VIII of the ICRW.
This exception will only be briefly discussed below in Part III.B, as it is
outside the scope of this Note. The second exception, which is the focus
64
of this Note, is the aboriginal subsistence exception. This exception
65
originally allowed for the taking or killing of whales “when the meat
and products of such whales are to be used exclusively for local
66
consumption by the aborigines.” The IWC has recognized the
difference between aboriginal subsistence whaling and commercial
67
whaling since the IWC’s establishment. While commercial whaling
seeks to maximize catches and profit, aboriginal whaling is practiced for
68
cultural and survival purposes.
Despite the inclusion of two exceptions, the moratorium did not
appease everyone, and since its implementation, the global community
69
has been fragmented regarding whaling. In 2000, the IWC’s secretary of
twenty-four years retired and issued a stark warning:
Whaling is going on at a commercial level. It’s outside IWC control. I
would think it much better that it was brought within international
regulations and oversight. I think the [IWC] will need to move forward
in measures which would allow controlled whaling, otherwise it will
lose credibility. If the [IWC] cannot set its house in order, people will
70
start to ask: “Why do we need it at all?”

While some countries, including the United States, support the
moratorium, others have lodged objections to it and therefore are not
71
bound by it. The moratorium went into effect in 1986 and was supposed

and-purpose (last visited Dec. 18, 2015). It “sets out specific measures that the IWC has collectively
decided are necessary in order to regulate whaling and conserve whale stocks.” Id.
62. See Hunter et al., supra note 8, at 1051.
63. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, supra note 49, at art. VIII.
64. See Anderson v. Evans, 314 F.3d 1006, 1012 n.7 (2002) (prohibiting the taking or killing of
gray whales except where whale meat and products will be used by aborigine subsistence).
65. The IWC has amended the original language of the exception. Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F.3d
1135, 1140 (9th Cir. 2000).
66. See Anderson, 314 F.3d at 1012 n.7; see also International Convention for the Regulation of
Whaling, supra note 49, at art. V; Hodges, supra note 10, at 301.
67. Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling, Int’l Whaling Commission, http://iwc.int/aboriginal (last
visited Dec. 18, 2015).
68. Id.; see also Hodges, supra note 10, at 303.
69. See Hodges, supra note 10, at 324.
70. See Hunter et al., supra note 8, at 1059.
71. See Hodges, supra note 10, at 303; see also Hunter et al., supra note 8, at 1054. Pursuant to
ICRW Article V, section 3, an amendment “shall become effective with respect to all Contracting
Governments which have not presented objection but shall not become effective with respect to any
Government which has so objected until such date as the objection is withdrawn.” International
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, supra note 49, at art. V, § 3 (emphasis added).

L - Khoury_12 (Hamilton_12.7) (Do Not Delete)

December 2015]

WHALING IN CIRCLES

12/15/2015 6:06 PM

301

to provide for a cessation of all commercial whaling—rather than an
outright ban of all whaling—until a comprehensive review was
72
completed. However, in 1990, upon completion of the review, the IWC
73
decided to extend the moratorium. The controversial decision led to the
resignation of the head of the IWC Scientific Committee, who accused
“the IWC of treating the committee’s unanimous recommendations with
74
contempt.”
Frustrated with the continuing moratorium, Iceland, Norway,
Greenland, and the Faeroe Islands created the North Atlantic Marine
75
Mammal Commission (“NAMMCO”), a new “rival” international
76
whaling institution in 1992. The creation of NAMMCO, in and of itself,
77
challenged the legitimacy of the IWC. NAMMCO is similar to the IWC
in several respects. NAMMCO “focuses on modern approaches to the
study of the marine ecosystem as a whole, and to understanding better
78
the role of marine mammals in this system.” NAMMCO also calls for
cooperation in the conservation and management of whales and other
79
marine mammals. The most important difference between NAMMCO
and the IWC, however, is that NAMMCO does not prohibit all
commercial whaling. Instead, NAMMCO allocates whaling quotas based
80
on scientific data and sustainable management efforts. NAMMCO
provides an alternative for countries that decide to withdraw from the
81
IWC or opt out of specific IWC obligations, for instance, complying
82
with the moratorium.
The IWC was intended to provide a framework for international
whaling regulation. However, the IWC’s moratorium, even with its two
exceptions, proved too strict for some countries. As a result, pro-whaling
countries were forced to create their own regional regulatory body in
order to continue whaling legally, which in turn challenged the legitimacy
of the IWC. Consequently, the IWC’s moratorium further fragmented
the international community regarding whaling.

72. See Hunter et al., supra note 8, at 1054.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See Suhre, supra note 17, at 314.
76. See Hunter et al., supra note 8, at 1054.
77. Id.
78. Agreement, N. Atlantic Marine Mammal Comm’n, http://www.nammco.no/aboutnammco/nammco-agreement/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2015).
79. About NAMMCO, North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission, http://www.nammco.no/
about-nammco (last visited Dec. 18, 2015).
80. See Suhre, supra note 17, at 315.
81. See Japan Threatens to Set Up, or Join, Rival to IWC, Whale & Dolphin Conservation
(Sept. 1, 2003, 4:30 PM) http://us.whales.org/news/2003/09/japan-threatens-to-set-up-or-join-rival-toiwc (discussing Japan’s consideration of joining NAMMCO).
82. See Hunter et al., supra note 8, at 1057.
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B. The Role and Influence of the United States and
Nongovernmental Organizations
The U.S. government is at the heart of IWC’s moratorium because it
83
has taken a lead role in protecting whales. Because the IWC has no
enforcement mechanism, conservation groups lobbied Congress to pass
84
legislation that would give teeth to IWC regulations. Today, the main
legal provision for enforcing international whaling regulations is
85
contained in two pieces of U.S. law. The first is the Pelly Amendment to
86
the Fishermen’s Protective Act. The Pelly Amendment authorizes the
President to embargo wildlife products of foreign countries when those
countries’ nationals engage “in trade or taking that diminishes the
effectiveness of an international program in force with respect to the
United States for the conservation of endangered or threatened
87
species.” The second enforcement mechanism is the PackwoodMagnuson Amendment to the Fishery Conservation and Management
88
Act. Congress enacted the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment to restrict
the discretion in the Pelly Amendment through mandatory sanctions on
89
violators. As a result, “the effectiveness of the IWC can be directly
linked, in large part, to the United States’ willingness to support the IWC
90
unilaterally[.]”
Although the United States gave the IWC moratorium teeth
through the use of trade sanctions, the U.S. government has not had
91
much success imposing sanctions on violators for two reasons. First,
instead of imposing sanctions on violators, the United States has tried to
use the threat of sanctions as a bargaining chip to obtain favorable future
92
behavior. Second, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted one of the laws
“in a manner which has done little to strengthen the United States’ and
93
IWC’s goal of preserving and protecting [whales.]”

83. See Lessof, supra note 30, at 424.
84. Id. at 418.
85. Id. at 424.
86. Id. at 424–27.
87. Pelly Amendment, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Servs. Int’l Affairs, http://www.fws.gov/international/
laws-treaties-agreements/us-conservation-laws/pelly-amendment.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2015).
88. See Lessof, supra note 30, at 428–29.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 424.
91. Id. at 424–25; see also Suhre, supra note 17, at 318–20.
92. See Lessof, supra note 30, at 418.
93. Id. at 424–25; see also Suhre, supra note 17, at 318–20. On the international level, the
effectiveness of the IWC can be realized through other means. For example, IWC member states may
bring claims against other member states in the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”). See Hodges,
supra note 10, at 325. The ICJ recently ruled on a claim brought by anti-whaling states against Japan,
which prompted Japan to change its whaling practices to comply with international law obligations.
See Cymie R. Payne, Australia v. Japan: ICJ Halts Antarctic Whaling, Am. Soc’y of Int’l L. (Apr. 8,
2014), http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/18/issue/9/australia-v-japan-icj-halts-antarctic-whaling; see
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The United States’ support of the IWC goes beyond enacting
domestic laws. Many scholars credit the United States for strengthening
94
conservation policies at the IWC. In fact, some people claim that the
IWC only adopted the whaling moratorium due to pressure from the
95
United States and other anti-whaling nations. Others, in comparison,
emphasize the role that NGOs, particularly Greenpeace and EarthTrust,
96
played in shifting the debate from sustainable use to conservation. This
shift in the debate, for example, ultimately led to the extension of the
97
98
moratorium in 1990. These NGOs’ efforts are well documented and
should not be underestimated.
Individuals have also taken steps to stop whaling. In one antiwhaling demonstration, hundreds of people formed a shape of a giant
99
People have also peacefully
humpback on a Sydney beach.
100
demonstrated in the United Kingdom against the killing of whales.
However, not all demonstrations and protests are peaceful. The Sea
Shepherd Conservation Society (“Sea Shepherds”) is an American nonprofit organization established in 1977 for the purpose of “shutting down
101
illegal whaling.” The Sea Shepherds, known for their more militant
102
tactics, have gained publicity in the past few years, due in part to an
Animal Planet show entitled Whale Wars, which follows the Sea
Shepherds as they attempt to stop Japanese whaling crews from hunting
103
whales. The Sea Shepherds’ “primary tactics consist of ramming,
104
sabotaging, and sinking whale vessels.” They use ships that are

also Martin Fackler, Japan Plans to Resume Whaling Program, with Changes to Address Court
Concerns, N.Y. Times (Apr. 18, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/19/world/asia/japan-says-itwill-resume-whaling-off-antarctica.html. That being said, some argue that “[t]he essential binding
force can be found in ecopolitics, or normative environmental politics” and that the IWC should be
seen as a normative institution rather than one of legal enforcement. Hodges, supra note 10, at 323.
Under this theory, the anti-whaling coalition, led by the United States, would apply pressure on nonadhering states in hopes of changing practices based upon a belief of right and wrong behavior. Id. at
323–24.
94. See Lessof, supra note 30, at 424–25; Suhre, supra note 17, at 318–20; Watters & Dugger,
supra note 34, at 331.
95. See Watters & Dugger, supra note 34, at 331.
96. See Hunter et al., supra note 8, at 1054.
97. Id.
98. Id.; see also Watters & Dugger, supra note 34, at 332; Stein, supra note 2, at 180–82.
99. Stavros Teaching, Anti-Whaling Demonstration on Bondi Beach, Sydney, YouTube (Nov. 20,
2007), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SfPyo_wbGRM.
100. Latin America News, Anti-whaling Demonstrations in UK 07-11-11, YouTube (July 11, 2011),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eBAwN350xv0.
101. The History of Sea Shepherd, Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc’y, http://www.seashepherd.org/
who-we-are/our-history.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2015).
102. See Stein, supra note 2, at 181.
103. See Whale Wars, Animal Planet, http://www.animalplanet.com/tv-shows/whale-wars/ (last
visited Dec. 18, 2015).
104. See Stein, supra note 2, at 182.
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specifically designed and reinforced to “battle the whaling industry.”
During one of the Whale Wars episodes, Sea Shepherds and Japanese
106
whaling ships collided on the high seas. Occasionally, Sea Shepherd
107
crew members are arrested. Similar instances of protestors attacking
108
and sinking whaling boats around the world have also been documented.
It is evident that the United States and NGOs have played an
important role in supporting and strengthening conservation efforts at
the international level. However, the U.S. government extended its
conservation efforts to the domestic level by enacting several antiwhaling legislative acts, which directly affect the Makahs’ plans to resume
whaling.
IV. U.S. Laws and Court Decisions Affecting the Makahs’ Right to
Whale
Although the U.S. government approved the Makahs’ plans to
109
resume whaling, several domestic U.S. laws have presented a challenge
to the Makahs’ plans. Furthermore, as illustrated below, the Ninth
Circuit has interpreted those domestic laws in favor of whale
conservation and against the Makahs’ requests to resume whaling.
A. Neah Bay Treaty
The first legal instrument directly related to the Makahs’ whaling
rights is the 1855 Neah Bay Treaty, which is an agreement between the
110
U.S. government and the Makahs. In this Treaty, the Makahs agreed to
“cede[], relinquish[], and convey[] to the United States all their right,
title, and interest in and to the lands and country occupied by” the
111
tribe. In exchange, the Makahs received “[t]he right of taking fish and
112
of whaling or sealing.” The Neah Bay Treaty went into effect following
113
its ratification on March 8, 1859. Significantly, the Treaty contained no
expiration date or other provision suggesting when it would no longer be
114
binding on the contracting parties. Although the Treaty provided the
Makahs with the right to whale, the superceding enactment of a domestic

105. Id. at 182 n.280.
106. Whale Wars: Ships Collide in Final Confrontation, Animal Planet, http://www.animalplanet.
com/tv-shows/whale-wars/videos/ships-collide-in-final-confrontation/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2015).
107. See Stein, supra note 2, at 182; see also Agence France Presse, Paul Watson, Sea Shepherd
Founder, Disembarks in U.S. for First Time in Months, Huffington Post (Dec. 31, 2013, 5:12 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/31/paul-watson-sea-shepherd-us_n_4183030.html.
108. See Hodges, supra note 10, at 312.
109. Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F.3d 1135, 1138–42 (9th Cir. 2000).
110. Treaty of Neah Bay, supra note 6.
111. Id. at art. 1.
112. Id. at art. IV (emphasis added).
113. Treaty of Neah Bay, supra note 6.
114. Id.
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law rendered the Makahs’ Treaty rights void, including the right to hunt
whales. Over a century passed before the Makahs realized how difficult it
would be to reap their end of the bargain.
B. The Whaling Convention Act’s Effect on the Neah Bay Treaty
In 1946, nearly a century after the U.S. government entered into the
115
Neah Bay Treaty, the United States signed the ICRW. Three years
later, Congress passed the Whaling Convention Act (“WCA”) to
116
implement the ICRW domestically. Still in effect today, the WCA
prohibits whaling in violation of the ICRW, any IWC regulations, and
117
any regulations adopted by the Secretary of Commerce.
Although the WCA is silent as to the Neah Bay Treaty, the
enactment of the WCA rendered the Treaty void because Congress
retains the power to unilaterally modify or abrogate a treaty by later
118
acts. This has become known as the “last in time” principle, which
suggests that when two statutesor as in this case, a treaty and a
119
statuteconflict, the one enacted later in time prevails. In United States
120
v. Dion, the U.S. Supreme Court established a test to determine which
statute prevails if the later statute, as here, is silent regarding the first
statute. The Court stated: “What is essential is clear evidence (1) that
Congress actually considered the conflict between the intended action on
the one hand and Indian treaty rights on the other, and (2) chose to
121
resolve that conflict (3) by abrogating the treaty.”
In the case of the Neah Bay Treaty and the WCA, the first prong of
the test is met because Congress considered a potential conflict between
the WCA and Indian treaty rights generally. In Dion, the Court did not
find dispositive the fact that Congress was not aware of the specific treaty
122
at issue. Rather, Congress’ general awareness of a potential conflict
between Indian treaty rights and the new statute was sufficient to satisfy

115. See Hodges, supra note 10, at 300.
116. Id. at 301.
117. 16 U.S.C. § 916(c) (2013).
118. Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903).
119. Leesteffy Jenkins & Cara Romanzo, Makah Whaling: Aboriginal Subsistence or a Stepping
Stone to Undermining the Commercial Whaling Moratorium?, 9 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y 71,
104 (1998).
120. 476 U.S. 734 (1986). In Dion, a Native American defendant from the Yankton Sioux Tribe
was convicted of shooting four bald eagles in violation of the Endangered Species Act, which
prohibited the hunting of bald eagles in the United States absent a Secretary of the Interior permit.
Id. at 735–36. The Eighth Circuit vacated the conviction, relying on the defendant’s treaty right to hunt
bald eagles. Id. at 736. Under the treaty, the Yanktons ceded their land to the U.S. government in
exchange for, inter alia, the right to hunt and fish on their land. Id. at 737. Subsequently, the Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the enactment of certain laws abrogated the Yanktons’ treaty right.
Id. at 745.
121. Dion, 476 U.S. at 739–40.
122. See Jenkins & Romanzo, supra note 119, at 108.
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123

the first prong of the test. Therefore, here, it is irrelevant whether
Congress knew of the Neah Bay Treaty at the time it enacted the WCA,
so long as it knew about Indian treaty rights regarding whaling generally.
It further appears that Congress was aware of a potential conflict with
the Neah Bay Treaty because Congress specifically incorporated into the
124
WCA the aboriginal subsistence exception of the IWC. This further
shows that Congress considered that the WCA might affect some Indian
treaty rights. Therefore, the first prong is met.
125
As for the second and third prongs, “[t]he WCA specifically and
unequivocally incorporate[d] the ICRW and the IWC amended
126
Schedule.” Similar to the statute at issue in Dion, the WCA prohibition
127
is “sweepingly framed . . . [and] ‘exhaustive and careful.’” The WCA
128
specifically mentions what activities are unlawful, has an enforcement
129
130
mechanism, and lists penalties and fines. Moreover, the incorporation
of the aboriginal subsistence exception into the WCA “reveals a
congressional intent to resolve this tension in favor of creating a specific
131
exemption and quota to supersede any previous treaty rights to whale.”
The incorporation of the aboriginal subsistence exception into the WCA
is difficult to explain “except as a reflection of an understating that the
statute otherwise bans the taking of [whales] by Indians, a recognition
that such a prohibition would cause hardship for the Indians, and a
decision that that problem should be solved not by exempting Indians
from the coverage of the statute,” but by providing an exception in
132
narrow circumstances. Therefore, the second and third prongs are also
133
met to conclude that the WCA supersedes the Neah Bay Treaty. As a
result, the Treaty is void and the Makahs can no longer claim to have a
right to hunt whales under the Treaty. Unfortunately for the Makahs,
other domestic laws and court decisions prohibiting whaling pose
additional legal hurdles.

123. Id.
124. Id. at 107.
125. The second and third prongs state that Congress chose to resolve the conflict between the
intended action and the treaty right (second prong), by abrogating the treaty (third prong). Dion, 476
U.S. at 739–40.
126. Jenkins & Romanzo, supra note 119, at 106.
127. Dion, 476 U.S. at 740.
128. 16 U.S.C. § 916 (c) (2013).
129. Id. § 916 (g).
130. Id. § 916 (f).
131. Jenkins & Romanzo, supra note 119, at 107.
132. Dion, 476 U.S. at 740.
133. This explains why neither the Makahs nor the U.S. government argued that the Neah Bay
Treaty acts as an exception to the Marine Mammal Protection Act, discussed infra Part IV.D. The lack
of such an argument suggests that the U.S. government, during its representation of the Makahs, was
aware of the fact that the WCA superseded the Neah Bay Treaty.
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C. National Environmental Policy Act
In 1970, Congress enacted the National Environmental Policy Act
(“NEPA”) to “encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between
man and his environment” and “to promote efforts which will prevent or
134
eliminate damage to the environment.” The NEPA requires federal
agencies to take a “hard look” at and consider the environmental impact
135
of their actions. Under § 4332 of the NEPA, an Environmental Impact
Statement (“EIS”) must be prepared any time the “actions [of Federal
136
agencies] significantly [affect] the quality of the human environment.”
However, in deciding whether to prepare an EIS, government agencies
may rely on a less formal process known as an Environmental
137
Assessment (“EA”). Depending on the EA’s finding, the agency will
then complete an EIS or submit a Finding of No Significant Impact
138
(“FONSI”). Today, the NEPA is viewed as a statute that sets out
“action-forcing” procedural requirements and attempts to “promote
environmentally sensitive governmental decisionmaking, without
139
prescribing any substantive standards.” Therefore, in order for a
government agency to assist the Makahs in obtaining a whaling quota,
that agency must comply with NEPA requirements by taking a hard look
at the environmental impact of such a quota.
D. Marine Mammal Protection Act
In 1972, Congress enacted the Marine Mammal Protection Act
140
(“MMPA”). The MMPA implemented a moratoriuma complete
cessation of the taking of marine mammals, including whales, absent a
141
permit or waiver. The only explicit exemption from the MMPA’s
prohibition on the taking of marine mammals is provided in § 1371(b)
142
and applies to Alaskan natives only. Section 1372(a)(2) provides an
exception for the MMPA’s prohibition when the takings are “expressly
provided for by an international treaty, convention, or agreement to
which the United States is a party and which was entered into before
[1972] or by any statute implementing any such treaty, convention, or
143
agreement.” The MMPA’s prohibition, still in effect, presents a
challenge to the Makahs’ plans to resume whaling.

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2013).
Anderson v. Evans, 314 F.3d 1006, 1015–16 (9th Cir. 2002).
See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2013).
Anderson, 314 F.3d at 1017.
Id.
Id. at 1016; see also Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 2000).
16 U.S.C. § 1361 (2013).
Id. §§ 1371–1372; see also Anderson, 314 F.3d at 1023 (Gould, J., concurring).
16 U.S.C. § 1371(b) (2013).
Id. § 1372 (a)(2) (emphasis added).
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E. Ninth Circuit Decisions
In the following two cases, the Ninth Circuit considered the Makahs’
plans and requests to resume whaling in the contexts of the WCA,
144
NEPA, and MMPA. In the first case, Metcalf v. Daley, the Ninth
Circuit examined the Makahs’ plan to revive its culture and resume
whaling after the gray whale was removed from the endangered species
145
list in 1994. In this case, the Makahs had asked the U.S. Department of
Commerce for help with developing and presenting their plan to the
146
IWC. Following an evaluation of the Makahs’ request, the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA”), a division of the
147
U.S. Department of Commerce, decided to support the Makahs’ plan.
However, in the process of their support, the NOAA failed to comply
with the NEPA requirements by not publishing an EA or EIS for public
148
review.
In 1996, NOAA and the Makahs entered into a formal, written
agreement, whereby NOAA committed to present the Makahs’ proposal
149
to the IWC after the Makahs prepared an adequate statement of need.
Later that year, the U.S. government presented a formal proposal to the
150
IWC on behalf of the Makahs. However, several IWC member nations
“expressed concerns and indicated that they would vote against” the
151
proposal. Such concern and opposition derived partially from within
the Makahs themselves because the Makah Tribal Council’s process of
152
obtaining a quota did not include a referendum on the issue. The
153
proposal also faced opposition from U.S. politicians and NGOs. The
United States subsequently withdrew the IWC proposal when it realized
154
that the proposal lacked the support it needed to pass.
In 1997, NOAA became aware of the possibility that it violated
155
NEPA, and in order to comply, prepared an EA followed by a FONSI.
Prior to the 1997 IWC meeting, the U.S. and Russian governments
considered submitting a joint proposal requesting a gray whale quota for
the Makahs of the United States and for the Chukotka, a Siberian
156
aboriginal tribe located in Russia. This was a strategic alliance by the

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

214 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1138.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1139.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Watters & Dugger, supra note 34, at 332–34.
Id.
Metcalf, 214 F.3d at 1140.
Id. at 1139–40.
Id. at 1140.
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United States because the IWC had previously granted a gray whale
157
quota for the Siberian Chukotka. Subsequently, the U.S. government
submitted a joint proposal with Russia, asking for a quota of 620 whales
158
over a five-year period. During the IWC meeting, however, it became
clear that some of the delegates thought that the Makahs did not qualify
159
for the aboriginal subsistence exception. At that time, the IWC defined
aboriginal subsistence whaling as “whaling for the purposes of local
aboriginal consumption carried out by or on behalf of aboriginal,
indigenous or native peoples who share strong community, familial,
social and cultural ties related to a continuing traditional dependence on
160
whaling and the use of whales.” This posed a problem for the Makahs
because they had lived without whales for seventy years and therefore
did not meet the “continuing traditional dependence” aspect of the
161
definition. Nonetheless, after negotiations, the IWC approved the
quota and “the delegates agreed to amend the proposal to allow the
quota to be used only by aboriginal groups ‘whose traditional subsistence
162
and cultural needs have been recognized.’” However, to date, it
remains unclear who is responsible for recognizing such subsistence and
cultural needs.
In 1997, on the same day NOAA released the FONSI, Congressman
Jack Metcalf of Washington, along with various organizations concerned
about whaling (herein “appellants”), filed a complaint against the U.S.
government and the Makahs (herein “federal defendants”) for violating
163
NEPA. The appellants appealed the district court’s decision granting
164
the federal defendants’ motion for summary judgment. In determining
whether the federal defendants violated NEPA, the Ninth Circuit relied
165
on a Supreme Court decision in which the Court held that an EIS
166
“shall be prepared at the feasibility analysis [go/no-go] stage.” In other
words, the federal defendants should have prepared the EA, and
subsequently EIS or FONSI, before they signed a formal, written
167
agreement with the Makahs. The Ninth Circuit held that the federal
defendants’ commitment to helping the Makahs before preparing an EA
“probably influenced their evaluation of the environmental impact of the

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id.
Id. The Makahs would have been entitled to only a fraction of the 620 whales. Id.
Id.
See Hodges, supra note 10, at 304 (emphasis added).
Id.
Metcalf, 214 F.3d at 1140.
Id.
Id. at 1141.
Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347 (1979).
Metcalf, 214 F.3d at 1142 (quoting Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 351 n.3 (1979)).
Id. at 1143, 1145.
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proposal.”
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that the federal
defendants violated NEPA by preparing an untimely EA and failing to
169
prepare an EIS.
Merely two years after Metcalf, the government’s approval of the
170
Makahs’ whaling plans faced yet another legal challenge. In Anderson
v. Evans, the Ninth Circuit once again found the federal government in
171
violation of NEPA. Here, however, the court concluded that even
though the government prepared a timely EA, it violated NEPA by
172
preparing a FONSI instead of an EIS. The court reasoned that “there
[were] substantial questions remaining as to whether the [Makahs’]
whaling plans [would] have a significant effect on the environment,” and
173
therefore, the government should have prepared an EIS.
In the same case, the Ninth Circuit also found the government in
violation of the MMPA for improperly approving the Makahs’ whaling
174
plan in 1997. Section 1372 of the MMPA provides for an exception to
175
the blanket moratorium on whaling. This exception applies when
whaling has been “expressly provided for by an international treaty,
convention, or agreement to which the United States is a party and which
was entered into before [1972] or by any statute implementing any such
176
treaty, convention, or agreement.” The court held that the exception
177
did not apply here for four reasons. First, the IWC Schedule that
approved the Makahs’ quota passed in 1997, well after the 1972 cutoff
178
date allowed by the exception. Second, even if the 1997 IWC Schedule
related back to the 1946 Convention and predated the MMPA, the IWC
Schedule expressly failed “to provide any whaling quota for the
179
[Makahs]” as required by the MMPA’s exception. Third, the express
requirement of § 1372(a)(2) was not satisfied due to the vague definition
of the IWC’s aboriginal subsistence exception and the uncertainty as to
180
who conducts the recognition. Fourth, “there [was] no domestic statute
implementing the ICRW that expressly permit[ed] the [Makahs’]

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 1145.
Id.
See Anderson v. Evans, 314 F.3d 1006, 1006 (9th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1009.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1030.
Anderson, 314 F.3d at 1023; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1372 (a)(2) (2013).
16 U.S.C. § 1372 (a)(2) (2013) (emphasis added).
Anderson, 314 F.3d at 1023–25.
Id. at 1023–24.
Id. at 1024–25.
Id. at 1025.
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181

whaling.” Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that the government
182
violated the MMPA by approving the Makahs’ whaling plan.
As a result of these two cases, the Makahs could not legally hunt
whales under domestic law. The cases illustrate the challenges and
complications of approving the Makahs’ proposals under domestic laws.
However, beyond violating domestic laws, the Makahs’ proposals present
significant issues on an international level.
V. The Makahs’ Proposal: International Problems,
Precedent, and Perception
There is no doubt that the Makahs had a long and demonstrable
183
tradition of whaling for both nutritional and cultural purposes.
However, the Makahs voluntarily ceased hunting whales in the 1920s—
nearly half a century before the moratorium went into effect—and
184
continued to survive without whale meat as a source of subsistence. For
that reason, the Makahs’ petition to the IWC focused on the importance
of whaling to the Makahs’ culture, rather than on their nutritional
185
dependency on whale meat. The Makahs’ culture-based proposal was
problematic because until the IWC’s approval of the Makahs’ quota, the
IWC had only granted the exception to groups that had consistently
186
relied upon whale meat for nutritional and cultural needs. To solve the
problem, the United States amended its domestic subsistence regulations
187
to allow for whaling based on “cultural and/or subsistence” need. The
United States also lobbied the delegates at the IWC and amended the
aboriginal subsistence exception to groups “whose traditional subsistence
188
and cultural needs have been recognized.” By doing so, the U.S.
government fit the Makahs within a domestic exception because of the
“and/or” language, and was able to formally recognize the Makahs’
“traditional subsistence and cultural needs” as required by the amended
IWC definition. However, “[c]onspicuously absent from [the IWC
definition] is any delineation of who must [conduct this] recognition and
189
how.” Because it remains unclear who has the authority to “recognize”
these needs, any country can claim such recognition on behalf of its
190
aboriginal communities. The Ninth Circuit recognized the danger of

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id.
Id. at 1030.
See Hodges, supra note 10, at 320.
Id.; see also Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F.3d 1135, 1137 (9th Cir. 2000).
See Hodges, supra note 10, at 320.
See Hodges, supra note 10, at 320; see also Watters & Dugger, supra note 34, at 341.
50 C.F.R. § 230.2 (1996); see also Hodges, supra note 10, at 320.
Metcalf, 214 F.3d at 1140.
Anderson v. Evans, 314 F.3d 1006, 1022 (9th Cir. 2002).
Id.
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191

the tactics used by the United States and warned: “[These tactics] could
be used as a precedent for other countries to declare the subsistence need
of their own aboriginal groups, thereby making it easier for such groups
192
to gain approval for whaling.”
The real concern here is that other countries, such as Japan and
Norway, have aboriginal communities that technically meet the new IWC
193
definition, yet have been consistently denied applications for aboriginal
194
whaling. Thus, in allowing the Makahs to hunt under the aboriginal
subsistence exception based on a purely cultural needs, the IWC set a
precedent that would open the door for other communities to put forth
195
and rely on similar cultural-needs claims. In fact, some argue that other
communities will likely have even stronger cultural claims than that
196
shown by the Makahs. Broadening the aboriginal subsistence exception
197
would have a “domino effect” that will create the “danger of rendering
198
the commercial whaling moratorium essentially meaningless.” Therefore,
the Makahs’ proposals present significant issues on the international level,
which require careful attention and consideration.
VI. The Current State of and Issues Faced by Whaling
Although the Ninth Circuit held against the Makahs’ plan, the
IWC’s approval of the quota is still technically valid for IWC aboriginal
199
The IWC currently lists five
subsistence exception purposes.
indigenous people with approved quotas to hunt whales under the
aboriginal subsistence exception, including native Alaskans (“Inuits”),

191. This entails, in essence, the changing and tailoring of domestic law to fit aboriginals within an
exception or setting aboriginals outside the reach of anti-whaling laws.
192. Anderson, 314 F.3d at 1022.
193. See Hodges, supra note 10, at 320 n.155; see also Jenkins & Romanzo, supra note 119, at 88–92.
194. See Watters & Dugger, supra note 34, at 337; see also Suhre, supra note 17, at 325, 327–28; see,
e.g.,
IWC
Resolution
1996-1,
Int’l
Whaling
Commission,
https://archive.iwc.int/pages/
view.php?ref=2072&search=%21collection72&offset=0&order_by=relevance&sort=DESC&archive=0&k=
&go=next&curpos=14& (last visited Dec. 18, 2015) (presenting resolution for distressed coastal Japanese
communities dependant on whaling for cultural, social, dietary, and economic needs); IWC Resolution 1990-1,
Int’l Whaling Commission, https://archive.iwc.int/pages/view.php?ref=2066&search=%21collection72&
offset=0&order_by=relevance&sort=DESC&archive=0&k=&go=next&curpos=14& (last visited Dec. 18,
2015).
195. See Jenkins & Romanzo, supra note, 119, at 93–95; see also Watters & Dugger, supra note 34,
at 337.
196. See Jenkins & Romanzo, supra note, 119, at 95–96; see also Suhre, supra note 17, at 322–28.
197. See Watters & Dugger, supra note 34, at 320; see also Brenda Peterson, Who Will Speak for
the Whales?—Elders Call for a Spiritual Dialogue on Makah Tribe’s Whaling Proposal, Seattle Times
(Dec. 22, 1996, 12:00 AM), http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19961222&slug
=2366339.
198. See Jenkins & Romanzo, supra note 119, at 94.
199. Ninth Circuit decisions are only binding domestically and do not affect the IWC.
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200

Chukotkas, and Makahs. The Chukotka and Makahs had a combined
approved quota of 620 Eastern North Pacific gray whales from 2008 to
201
2012. According to the IWC, the Makahs have caught two gray whales
under the aboriginal subsistence exception: the first in 1999 and the
202
second in 2007. As of 2007, the Eastern North Pacific gray whale stock
203
According to the
was estimated between 17,000 and 22,000.
International Union for the Conservation of Nature (“IUCN”) Red
204
List and the National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”), two sources
205
the IWC relies on for scientific reports, the gray whale is no longer in
206
danger of extinction. The IUCN Red List has nine categories, ranking
207
from “Not Evaluated” species to “Extinct” species. The IUCN Red
List has the gray whale under its “Least Concern” category, three full
208
categories away from the “Endangered” list. The mere fact that the
quota was approved under the IWC’s strict standards shows that the
Makahs’ proposed quota would not have had a significant negative
impact on the whale stock. A spokesperson for the NMFS, an organ of
NOAA, stated, “There isn’t any question about the biological impact of
[the Makahs] taking 20 whales over the course of five years out of a
population of 20,000 gray whales . . . Its impact would be . . .
209
insignificant.”
The combined approved quota under the aboriginal subsistence
exception is about a third of the number of whales hunted every year for

200. Catch Limits & Catches Taken, Int’l Whaling Commission, http://iwc.int/
index.php?cID=html_76#aborig (last visited Dec. 18, 2015).
201. Id.
202. Catches Taken: ASW, Int’l Whaling Commission, http://iwc.int/table_aboriginal (last visited
Dec. 18, 2015).
203. Whale Population Estimates, Int’l Whaling Commission, http://iwc.int/estimate#table (last
visited Dec. 18, 2015).
204. The IUCN is a leading authority on the conservation status of species. The IUCN Red List’s
goal is “[t]o provide information and analyses on the status, trends and threats to species in order to
inform and catalyse action for biodiversity conservation.” Overview of the IUCN Red List,
Introduction, IUCN Red List of Threatened Species, http://www.iucnredlist.org/about/
overview#introduction (last visited Dec. 18, 2015).
205. Status of Whales, Int’l Whaling Commission, http://iwc.int/status (last visited Dec. 18, 2015).
206. Eschrichtius Robustus, IUCN Red List of Threatened Species, http://www.iucnredlist.org/
details/summary/8097/0 (last visited Dec. 18, 2015); see also Endangered and Threatened Marine
Species Under NMFS’ Jurisdiction, Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/
pr/species/esa/listed.htm#mammals (last visited Dec. 18, 2015).
207. Int’l Union for Conservation of Nature, IUCN Red List of Threatened Species 14–15
(2d ed. 2012).
208. Eschrichtius Robustus, supra note 206.
209. Eric Rosenberg, Makah Hopeful About Whaling Again by 2010, Seattle Post-Intelligencer
(Jan. 13, 2008, 10:00 PM), http://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/Makah-hopeful-about-whaling-againby-2010-1261497.php. Only a small fraction of the 620 quota mentioned above was dedicated to the
Makahs. Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F.3d 1135, 1140 (9th Cir. 2000).
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210

commercial purposes. Countries that submitted official and timely
objections to the IWC’s moratorium are not bound by it and can
211
therefore legally engage in commercial whaling. Between 1985 and
2013, Norway, Japan, the U.S.S.R., and Iceland commercially hunted
212
over 23,000 whales. Additionally, Norway increased its commercial
213
quota for minke whales from 226 in 1993 to 885 in 2009, showing no
intention of slowing down or ceasing whaling.
Japan, on the other hand, has taken a completely different route to
214
continue whaling, relying on the IWC’s scientific permit exception.
215
Japan’s whaling practices have been controversial, and have been
216
condemned in many IWC meetings. In March 2014, the ICJ found
217
Japan in violation of its international law obligations under the ICRW.
In its ruling, the ICJ “questioned whether [Japan’s whaling] program was
really for research, pointing out that it had yielded few scientific
218
results.” Therefore, the ICJ ordered Japan to suspend all permits and
219
In April 2014, Japan
halt all whaling in the Southern Ocean.
announced its plan to redesign the research program to address the ICJ’s
220
concerns, which would allow Japan to resume whaling.
Another IWC member state, which nonetheless continues to whale,
221
is Iceland. Iceland has always opposed the IWC moratorium, but was
still bound by it because, unlike Norway, it did not file an official
222
objection when the moratorium went into effect in 1986. However, in
1992, Iceland withdrew from the IWC in protest over the decision to
223
extend the moratorium and subsequently joined NAMMCO. In 2002,
Iceland was readmitted into the IWC and was allowed to file a

210. The IWC approved a total quota of 1137 whales for aboriginal subsistence between 2008 and
2012, compared to 3247 of whales hunted for commercial purposes between 2008 and 2012. Compare
Catch Limits & Catches Taken, supra note 200, with Catches Taken: Under Objection or Under
Reservation, Int’l Whaling Commission, http://iwc.int/table_objection (last visited Dec. 18, 2015).
211. See Lessof, supra note 30, at 421.
212. Catches Taken: Under Objection or Under Reservation, supra note 210.
213. See Hunter et al., supra note 8, at 1058.
214. Id.
215. Peter W. Kirby, The Big Lie Behind Japanese Whaling, N.Y. Times (Oct. 13, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/14/opinion/the-big-lie-behind-japanese-whaling.html?smprod=nytcoreiphone&smid=nytcore-iphone-share; see also Hodges, supra note 10, at 310–11; Jenkins & Romanzo,
supra note 119, at 89–90.
216. See Hunter et al., supra note 8, at 1059.
217. Whaling in the Antarctic (Austl. v. Japan: N.Z. intervening), Judgment, 2014 I.C.J. 148, ¶ 233
(Mar. 31); see Payne, supra note 93.
218. See Fackler, supra note 93.
219. See Payne, supra note 93.
220. See Fackler, supra note 93.
221. See Hodges, supra note 10, at 312.
222. Id. at 312–14.
223. Id. at 312; see Hunter et al., supra note 8, at 1062.
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224

reservation to the IWC’s moratorium. As a result, Iceland is currently
225
not bound by the moratorium and continues to whale.
Iceland’s withdrawal and readmission with a reservation, Norway’s
persistent objections, Japan’s misuse of the scientific permit exception,
and the creation of NAMMCO “call into question the effectiveness,
226
[and] indeed the relevance, of the IWC.” The IWC has been successful
in reviving some whale stocks, but many, including former IWC officials
227
and ocean policy scholars, have criticized the IWC and its decisions.
The international community’s disapproval and dissatisfaction with the
IWC and its regulations are evident in the continued discussions
228
regarding the establishment of regional whaling organizations. These
calls for regional regulatory bodies continue to challenge the legitimacy
229
of the IWC.
VII. Solution: Hunting for a Middle Ground
It appears from the criticism, objections, and fragmentation of the
international community regarding whaling that the current moratorium
approach is not effective in accomplishing the entirety of the IWC’s
vision for the future of whaling. The moratorium has only been
successful at reviving and conserving certain whale stocks, which is only
part of what the IWC seeks to achieve. The other part, which the IWC
has failed to achieve by diverting its attention to a complete moratorium,
is the control of international whaling through regulations, which
requires compliance and some level of consensus. Because pro-whaling
nations have shown an increased frustration with the moratorium, “[t]he
failure to resolve the current deadlock within the IWC could lead to a
230
breakup or even a complete dissolution of the IWC.” The continued
ambiguity regarding the aboriginal subsistence exception further
exacerbates the situation. To fix the issue, the following steps should be
taken: (1) the moratorium should be lifted for certain whale stocks;
(2) the IWC should strengthen its enforcement authority; and (3) the
aboriginal subsistence exception should be clarified, both domestically
and internationally.

224. See Hunter et al., supra note 8, at 1062.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1059.
227. Id. at 1058–59; see also Hodges, supra note 10, at 322.
228. See Hodges, supra note 10, at 311.
229. See Hunter et al., supra note 8, at 1057.
230. See Lisa Kobayashi, Lifting the International Whaling Commission’s Moratorium on
Commercial Whaling as the Most Effective Global Regulation of Whaling, 29 Environs Envtl. L. &
Pol’y J. 177, 205 (2006).
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A. Lift the Moratorium for Certain Whale Stocks
The moratorium on whaling was implemented due to concerns with
231
diminishing whale stocks. In order to determine whether such a
justification for the moratorium still exists, it is necessary to examine
scientific data on whale stocks. Recent scientific evidence shows that
certain whale stocks are healthy enough to resume controlled and
232
sustainable whaling. Data from the IWC shows that many whale stocks,
including species that were once “heavily exploited,” have recovered or
233
are recovering at an increased annual rate. For example, in the North
234
Atlantic, humpbacks have recovered to pre-exploitation levels, and in
other parts of the world, humpbacks are recovering at a ten percent
235
annual increase rate. Other whales, including gray whales in the
Eastern North Pacific, which the Makahs had hunted, and bowhead
236
whales, are also either fully recovered or are in a “healthy state.”
Because there is scientific evidence that whale stocks have
recovered and some are even thought to be healthier than their pre237
exploitation numbers, there is no longer a scientific justification for a
global moratorium. While there may be a justification based on moral or
ethical grounds, such an argument is unlikely to gain traction because
pro-whaling countries have shown signs of increased whaling and
frustration with the current system. Furthermore, some argue that pro238
whaling nations have recently gained support. In fact, during the IWC’s
2005 meeting, twenty-three member states voted in favor of lifting the
239
moratorium, twenty-nine voted against it, and five abstained. This
shows that, at least in 2005, nearly half of the member states were either
240
in support of or did not oppose lifting the moratorium.
Nevertheless, a precautionary approach should be taken with
certain whale stocks because such an approach “addresses how
241
environmental decisions are made in the face of scientific uncertainty.”
This precautionary approach, which is gaining traction as a principle of
international environmental law, is best explained as follows: “Where

231. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, supra note 49.
232. Status of Whales, supra note 205; see also Kobayashi, supra note 230, at 201.
233. Status of Whales, supra note 205.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. See Kobayashi, supra note 230, at 208; Tom Clifford, Slaughter Ahead as Whaling Ban May
End, Gulf News (Mar. 16, 2005), http://gulfnews.com/news/world/other-world/slaughter-ahead-aswhaling-ban-may-end-1.280924.
239. See Kobayashi, supra note 230, at 208 n.244.
240. See Clifford, supra note 238 (citing fifteen member states in 2002 and twenty-one in 2003
supported lifting moratorium in previous years).
241. See Hunter et al., supra note 8, at 478.
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there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of scientific
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective
242
measures to prevent environmental degradation.” Thus, where there is
a lack of scientific evidence that a specific whale stock is not yet healthy
enough for sustainable whaling, and hunting that specific stock might
lead to serious or irreversible damage, protective measures should be
applied until scientific evidence proves otherwise.
To properly apply the precautionary approach and to avoid overexploiting whale stocks, an IWC scientific committee should review
requests for whaling quotas and determine the appropriate outcome.
Such committee should take a scientific approach when determining a
quota and rely on studies and data from unbiased and reliable sources.
The committee should review each request objectively, from a fair and
impartial position. For example, in the Makahs’ case, the scientific
committee would base its decision on the status of the Eastern North
Pacific gray whale stock, the quota requested, and the Makahs’
legitimate needs, but not the fact that it is an American request.
B. Stronger IWC Enforcement Authority
In order to ensure compliance with IWC regulations, the IWC must
have enforcement authority because unenforced regulations lead to a
lack of deterrence which invites a lack of compliance. By lifting the
moratorium and allowing whaling to resume, the IWC can continue to
regulate the whaling activity of its member states. The IWC, in and of
itself, has the potential to effectively control whaling by its member
states. However, throughout its history, the IWC has consistently been
243
criticized for its inability to enforce its own regulations “like a sheriff
244
without a gun.” Currently, the ICRW leaves enforcement entirely up to
member states, merely providing, “Each Contracting Government shall
take appropriate measures to ensure the application of the provisions of
this Convention and the punishment of infractions against the said
provisions in operations carried out by persons or by vessels under its
245
jurisdiction.” Additionally, as mentioned earlier in Part III, the United
246
States’ enforcement mechanism has not had much success. The lack of
international supervision and the possibility that some member states do
not domestically enforce the ICRW contribute to the lack of political will
247
to cooperate.

242. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. 1), annex I, principle 15 (Aug. 12, 1992).
243. See Lessof, supra note 30, at 421.
244. Id. at 424.
245. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, supra note 49, at art. IX.
246. See Lessof, supra note 30, at 424–25; see also Suhre, supra note 17, at 318–20.
247. See Kobayashi, supra note 230, at 217.
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This problem has two possible solutions. First, the ICRW could be
amended to include mandatory enforcement and reporting by member
states. However, such regulations will likely face criticism for being too
248
restrictive. Moreover, because consent of any affected party is required
249
in order to amend the ICRW, it is unlikely to be amended in such a
way. The second and preferred solution is for the IWC to become a
250
United Nations body. This approach has potential because the United
Nations Charter (“Charter”) and the General Assembly both have broad
aims that cover the IWC’s goals. The Charter aims to “establish
conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising
251
from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained.”
Because the IWC imposes obligations on member states as part of a
treaty, it is covered by the Charter’s aim. Furthermore, the General
Assembly aims to “promot[e] international co-operation in the
252
economic, social, [and] cultural . . . fields.” This aim covers the IWC
because whaling concerns economic, social, and cultural fields. Thus,
both aims are broad enough to cover the IWC’s efforts of whale
conservation and regulation.
With more resources, more influence, and more power, the United
Nations would be better equipped than the IWC in its present form to
enforce whaling laws on an international level. That would be especially
true if the General Assembly were to approve specialized agencies
focused on whaling because it becomes the General Assembly’s
responsibility to ensure that such agencies fulfill their functions and
253
obligations. Therefore, by making the IWC a body of the United
Nations, the IWC will have more enforcement power and authority to
implement its post-moratorium regulations.
C. Clarify the Aboriginal Subsistence Exception Internationally
and Domestically
Ambiguous and unclear laws lead to conflicts and inconsistencies.
The exact definition and scope of the aboriginal subsistence exception on
the international level remain unclear, leaving the door open for
254
As a result of the inconsistent
inconsistent interpretations.
interpretations, countries like Japan and Norway contend that the
United States receives special treatment from the IWC for its aborigines

248. See Lessof, supra note 30, at 440 (stating that measures that are too restrictive are likely to
threaten the ICRW).
249. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. XXXIX–XLI, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
250. See Kobayashi, supra note 230, at 217.
251. U.N. Charter, pmbl. (emphasis added).
252. U.N. Charter, art. 13,¶ 1(b) (emphasis added).
253. U.N. Charter, art. 57–63.
254. See infra Part V.
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that natives from their countries are denied.
Moreover, the
Norwegians, in particular “believe that the IWC has been taken over by
non-compromising political bodies, particularly under pressure by the
256
United States.” Evidence shows that certain Japanese and Norwegian
communities have had a long tradition of whaling, some even longer than
257
the Alaskan Inuits and the Makahs. Furthermore, even though the
IWC has recognized the “extreme distress” in which some of those
Japanese and Norwegian communities live in as a result of the
moratorium, the IWC has yet to grant those communities an aboriginal
258
subsistence quota.
In order to make the process of obtaining aboriginal subsistence
quota more fair, the IWC should implement two changes. First, the IWC
should amend its definition of the aboriginal subsistence exception to
grant quotas to aboriginal groups whose traditional subsistence and
cultural needs have been recognized by the IWC. This definition
addresses the current ambiguity and clarifies that the IWC is the party
responsible for the recognition. Second, the IWC should implement an
unbiased, scientific approach to determine aboriginal subsistence needs.
The IWC should view communities objectively, and determine their
statuses under the exception based solely on scientific findings rather
than on political views. The committee should take into account scientific
data about quotas requested and the respective whale stocks, whaling
traditions and cultures, and subsistence needs. This process would
provide countries with assurance that their communities’ requests for
quotas receive fair and impartial reviews without undue influence from
anti-whaling countries like the United States.
As for a domestic solution to the aboriginal subsistence exception, if
the United States intends for the Makahs to be able to legally whale, it
must amend its domestic laws. The United States may do so by providing
the Makahs with an explicit exception in the MMPA and ensuring that
future proposals comply with other domestic laws, including NEPA and
the WCA. Additionally, in order to comply with the Ninth Circuit
decisions, the U.S. government must objectively evaluate the Makahs’
plan and prepare either an EIS or a FONSI in compliance with NEPA
before representing them at the international level. Further, clarification
of the aboriginal subsistence exception will leave less room for
inconsistent interpretations, which will placate international concerns
about the current system and about the IWC’s perceived preferential

255. See Anderson v. Evans, 314 F.3d 1006, 1022 n.17 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that Japan has
attempted to block whaling quotas for other nations until quota for Japanese communities was
approved); see also Hodges, supra note 10, at 316; Suhre, supra note 17, at 322–28.
256. See Hodges, supra note 10, at 316.
257. See Suhre, supra note 17, at 322–28.
258. Id. at 325.
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treatment of the United States. If the U.S. government wants to be
perceived as an equal member of the IWC, it must amend its domestic
laws to fit the Makahs within an exception, present a new proposal to the
IWC on behalf of the Makahs, and go through the same impartial and
scientific review process imposed on other countries to obtain a quota.
Conclusion
The international community is currently fragmented and divided
regarding whaling. In order for the U.S. government to allow the Makahs
to legally resume subsistence whaling, the government must amend its
domestic laws to include an explicit exception for the Makahs and
present the IWC with a new proposal. However, allowing the Makahs to
resume subsistence whaling might set a dangerous precedent that will
lead to the further disruption of international consensus regarding
whaling. To solve this problem, the IWC must lift its moratorium and
allow for specific whale stocks to be hunted under science-based IWC
regulations. Doing so will enable the IWC to balance monitoring and
controlling whaling while allowing countries to meet the cultural and
economic needs of their people.
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Appendix: List of Abbreviations
EA

Environmental Assessment

EIS

Environmental Impact Statement

FONSI

Finding of No Significant Impact

ICJ

International Court of Justice

ICRW

International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling

IWC

International Whaling Commission

MMPA

Marine Mammal Protection Act

NEPA

National Environmental Policy Act

NGO

Nongovernmental Organization

NMFS

National Marine Fisheries Service

NOAA

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

WCA

Whaling Convention Act
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